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SOCIAL MAKEUP AND SOLITARY REASON* 
ZSUZSANNA KONDOR 
RIENDSHIP IS A CURIOUS PHENOMENON, as everyone has a certain sense 
of it, but to define its exact meaning is not a simple task. As 
Wittgenstein quotes Augustine deliberating on the concept of time, 
we can say friendship is “[S]omething that we know when no one asks us, but 
no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it”.1 I do not 
mention Wittgenstien incidentally. He was sceptical of theoretical analysis, 
quite explicitly in certain cases. Wittgenstein calls attention to difficulties 
which arise when we think of language along the lines Socrates understood it 
in the Theaetetus, i.e. when we consider “speech” as if it was “the composition 
of names”. Distinguishing between composite and simple elements2, essen-
tial and inessential features of an object3, as well as the existence and non-
existence of the object of a proposition4 creates unsolvable anomalies. These 
anomalies can be eliminated only by adopting a basically different 
conception of language.5 
Considering friendship, we find something similar in Plato’s Lysis. After 
the cumbersome deliberation of different aspects of friendship, he concludes: 
“O Menexenus and Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and I, an old 
boy, who would fain be one of you, should imagine ourselves as friends – this 
is what the by-standers will go away and say – and as yet we have not been 
able to discover what is a friend!” 
To mention Plato and Wittgenstein6 in the first paragraph – two crucial 
figures at significant turning points in the history of philosophy – is to 
indicate that I would like to examine friendship not from the aspect of ethics 
                                         
* A szöveg az OTKA T/F 046261 fil. számú kutatási program keretei között készült. 
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans.: G. E. M. Anscombe, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963 §89 
2 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, op. cit. § 47 
3 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, op. cit. § 62 
4 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, op. cit. § 79 
5 The same basic conviction of Wittgenstein is of course present in those remarks 
which deal with the function or limits of philosophy. See Philosophical 
Investigations §123, §124, and §125. 
6 Plato is obviously considered to be the philosopher at the time of the transition 
from primary orality to literacy. Wittgenstein’s philosophy was “directly 
influenced by phenomena of a post-literal type”. See about it J. C. Nyíri, “Post-




– though the notion of friendship emerged mostly in the context of ethics – 
but from the perspective of communications technology, and its impact on 
the history of philosophy. Accordingly, I consider friendship to be a concept 
deeply embedded in the culture of literacy, although it does not fit organically 
into its epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical framework. This ambi-
valence is quite obvious since literacy is determined by the representational 
system of writing, which was excellently appropriate for creation of the 
intellectual and institutional framework of solitude, as opposed to representa-
tional skills – including the technology of writing – which are bound up with 
social intercourse. To prove my thesis, I will first roughly outline the concept 
of friendship, then sum up the main morals of the so-called ‘Toronto School’, 
and then draft Merlin Donald’s cognitive evolutionary survey. In conclusion, 
I will show, that the recently developing concept of friendship fits nicely into 
primordial human social makeup and tends to diffuse, as opposed to the 
unique and sublime concept of the last twenty-five centuries.  
THE CONCEPT OF FRIENDSHIP IN THE AGE OF LITERACY 
In the Symposium of Plato, “the wickedness of mankind” was the reason 
for dividing the primordial “one”, a whole human nature into two parts. This 
division ends in “the desire and pursuit of the whole” which is called love.7 
Friendship and love are very close to each other, viz. love inspires 
friendship.8 According to the desire of the whole “when one of them meets 
with his other half, the actual half of himself, whether he be a lover of youth 
or a lover of another sort, the pair are lost in an amazement of love and 
friendship and intimacy, and would not be out of the other’s sight, as I may 
say, even for a moment: these are the people who pass their whole lives 
together; yet they could not explain why they desire of one another.”9 
                                         
7 “And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, 
and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time, I say, 
when we were one, but now because of the wickedness of mankind God has 
dispersed us…” Plato, “Symposium”, in: The Dialogues of Plato, op. cit. p. 158. 
8 Cf. “for the interest of rulers require that their subjects should be poor in spirit 
and that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among them, 
which love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire” (Italics are mine.) 
Plato, “Symposium”, in: The Dialogues of Plato, op. cit., p. 154 
9 Plato, “Symposium”, in: The Dialogues of Plato, op. cit., p. 158 
 319 
Aristotle created quite an elaborate concept of friendship, however the 
core of it was something similar, viz. a friend can be someone whom we love, 
can be considered “another self”10, and “friendship depends on community”11 
To cast a glance at the prominent thinkers of modern philosophy (i.e. 
Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes), we see that according to their main 
endeavours, ethics and friendship gained different importance.  
Bacon’s main claim, to renew sciences on the basis of experience, made it 
possible for him to notice special characteristics of human intercourse. Let 
me quote him: 
“For friendship maketh indeed a fair day in the affections, from storm and 
tempests; but it maketh daylight in the understanding, out of darkness, and 
confusion of thoughts. Neither is this to be understood only of faithful counsel, 
which a man receiveth from his friend; but before you come to that, certain it 
is, that whosoever hath his mind fraught with many thoughts, his wits and 
understanding do clarify and break up, in the communicating and discoursing 
with another; he tosseth his thoughts more easily; he marshalleth them more 
orderly, he seeth how they look when they are turned into words: finally, he 
waxeth wiser than himself; and that more by an hour’s discourse, than by a 
day’s meditation. It was well said by Themistocles, to the king of Persia, that 
speech was like cloth of Arras, opened and put abroad; whereby the imagery 
doth appear in figure; whereas in thoughts they lie but as in packs. Neither is 
this second fruit of friendship, in opening the understanding, restrained only 
to such friends as are able to give a man counsel; (they indeed are best;) but 
even without that, a man learneth of himself, and bringeth his own thoughts 
to light, and whetteth his wits as against a stone, which itself cuts not. In a 
word, a man were better relate himself to a statue, or picture, than to suffer 
his thoughts to pass in smother.”12 
Descartes’ main aim was to re-establish human knowledge, i.e. to create 
its solid and unquestionable foundation and, as opposed to Bacon, the 
foundation of it has nothing to do with empirical data, but is provided by the 
intellectual effort of the individual mind. However, Descartes considered 
ethics a fruit of the tree whose root creates metaphysics. He did not find it 
                                         
10 See “he is related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self)” 
Nicomachean Ethics Book 9/4 (Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Translation 
by W. D. Ross, http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/WeirdWildWeb/courses/ 
wphil/readings/wphil_rdg09_nichomacheanethics_entire.htm) According to 
Sir D. Ross see 1161b 18, 1161b 28, 1166a 32, 1169b 6, 1170b 7. Sir David Ross, 
Aristotle, London: Routledge, 1995, 7th Chapter 
11 Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit. Book 8/9. 
12 Essays of Francis Bacon, The Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral, of Francis Ld. 
Verulam Viscount St. Albans; http://www.authorama.com/essays-of-francis-
bacon-27.html 
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necessary to create a systematic ethical theory. As he wrote: “It is true that 
normally I refuse to write down my thoughts concerning morality. I have two 
reasons for this. One is that there is no other subject in which malicious 
people can so readily find pretexts for vilifying me; and the other is that I 
believe only sovereigns, or those authorized by them, have the right to 
concern themselves with regulating the morals of other people"13 However, 
his main interest, and the results he achieved do not require a theory which 
takes human intercourse into consideration. His so-called “provisional moral 
code" in Discourse on the Method is devoted to the avoidance of mistakes, 
and to the attainment of happiness, to some extent until certainty can be 
established. In his Meditations, it becomes clear that to know what is true 
and good makes us free and unable to make a mistake.14 Actually, as Ernst 
Gellner in his posthumous book Language and Solitude noted “He 
[Descartes] thought it would be possible to judge the culture in which he had 
been reared from the vantage point of a solitary individual purified by doubt, 
who accepts nothing other than that which his own reason compels him to 
accept. Cosmic exile … was, above all cultural exile. It expresses extreme 
distrust of culture, one’s own and all others. Moreover, Descartes felt an 
acute contempt for culture, which he called ‘custom and example’ and 
considered to be the source of all error.”15 
According to Gellner, “The Crusoe tradition, which begins with Descartes, 
finds its supreme expression in Hume and Kant”.16 “What did Kant do?” – 
we could ask as Ian Hacking did: “One thing was to make something quite 
new out of ethics.”, as Hacking starts his answer, “In ancient Greece, the 
topic of ethics had been the good life. Values were out there in the world, and 
the good life could be perceived and, with diligence, lived. After that, after 
divine ethics, after Human naturalized ethics, and after much else, Kant 
made ethics utterly internal, the private duty of reason.”17  
                                         
13 The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, 3 vols., transl.: John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, Vol. 3 including Anthony Kenny, 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988, Vol. 3, p. 326 
14 “if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to deliberate 
about the right judgement or choice; in that case, although I should be wholly 
free, it would be impossible for me ever to be in a state of indifference” (The 
Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, Vol. 2, p. 40). Being indifferent means 
that we have less than clear and distinct perceptions of true or good. 
15 Ernest Gellner, Language and Solitude. Wittgenstein, Malinowski and the 
Habsburg Dilemma, Cambridge: University Press, 1998, p. 43 
16 Gellner, op. cit. p. 182 
17 Ian Hacking, “Self-Improvement”, in: Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology, 
Cambridge-London-Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 2002, p. 119 
 321 
In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant deliberates friendship in terms of 
love, respect and a certain kind of union. As he put it: “Friendship (conside-
red in its perfection) is the union of two persons through the equal mutual 
love and respect. It is easy to see that this is an ideal of each participating 
and sharing sympathetically in the other’s well-being through the morally 
good will that unites them…”18 
According to his general theoretical conviction, he emphasizes that friend-
ship “is never for a moment safe from interruptions if it is allowed to rest on 
feelings, and if this mutual sympathy and self-surrender are not subjected to 
principles or rules preventing excessive familiarity and limiting mutual love 
by requirements of respect.”19 
Kant speaks about a “moral friendship” as opposed to a pragmatic one, 
whose excellence is rooted in a special freedom to be able to communicate 
one’s ideas, “to reveal himself” on the basis of confidence and shared views of 
things. The fruit of moral friendship is that “He is not completely alone with 
his thoughts, as in a prison, but enjoys a freedom he cannot have with the 
masses, among whom he must shut himself up in himself.”20 
                                         
18 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans.: Mary Gregor, Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1993, p. 261 
19 “Although it is sweet to feel in such possession of each other as approaches fusion 
into one person, friendship is something so delicate (teneritas amicitiae) that 
it is never for a moment safe from interruptions if it is allowed to rest on 
feelings, and if this mutual sympathy and self-surrender are not subjected to 
principles or rules preventing excessive familiarity and limiting mutual love 
by requirements of respect. Such interruptions are common among 
uncultivated people, although they do not always result in a split (for they 
rabble fight and make up). Such people cannot part with each other, and yet 
they cannot be at one with each other since they need quarrels in order to 
savor the sweetness of being united in reconciliation. But any case the love in 
friendship can not be an affect; for emotion is blind in its choice, and after a 
while it goes up in smoke.” Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit. p. 262 
20 “Man is being meant for society (though he is also unsociable one), and 
cultivating the social state he feels strongly the need to reveal himself to 
others (even with no ulterior purpose). But on the other hand, hemmed in and 
cautioned by fear of misuse others may make of his disclosing his thoughts, he 
finds himself constrained to lock up in himself a good part of his judgments 
(especially those about other people). He would like to discuss with someone 
what he thinks about his associates, the government, religion and so forth, but 
he cannot risk it: partly because the other person, while prudently keeping 
back his own judgments, might use this to harm him, and conceal his own, so 
that he would lose something of the other’s respect by presenting himself 
quite candidly to him. 
If he finds someone intelligent – someone who, moreover, shares his general 
outlook on things – with whom he need not be anxious about this danger but 
reveal himself with complete confidence, he can then air his views. He is not 
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As we can see, the notion of friendship reflects upon human relationships 
and even intercourse. Epistemology, however, and the metaphysical framework 
of the individual – mainly after the Cartesian turn – do not contemplate any 
kind of social embeddedness. 
In the Platonic dialogues, the notion of friendship is based on the myth of 
primordial unity of divided human beings on the one hand, and theoretical 
deliberations, i.e. in the conceptual framework of love and creation, more 
precisely: poiesis. Aristotle distinguishes different kinds of friendship.21 The 
desirable, i.e. the “[P]erfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, 
and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are 
good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are 
most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and not inciden-
tally”.22 (Italics mine) That is reason gains crucial importance regarding 
                                                                                      
completely alone with his thoughts, as in a prison, but enjoys a freedom he cannot 
have with the masses, among whom he must shut himself up in himself. [. . .] 
This (merely moral friendship) is not just an ideal but (like blacks swans) 
actually exists here and there in its perfection. But that (pragmatic) friend-
ship, which burdens itself in with the ends of other men, although out of love, 
can have neither the purity nor the completeness requisite for a precisely 
determinant maxim; it is an ideal of one’s wishes, which knows no bounds in 
its rational concept but which must always be very limited in experience.” 
Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals op. cit. p. 263 
21 Three kinds of friendship according to Aristotle: friendship which is based on 
utility, pleasure and perfect friendship. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. 
cit. Book 8/2-3  
22 “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for 
these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves. 
Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; 
for they do this by reason of own nature and not incidentally; therefore their 
friendship lasts as long as they are good-and goodness is an enduring thing. 
And each is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both 
good without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; 
for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to 
each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of 
the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as might be expected 
permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have. 
For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure-good or pleasure either 
in the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling-
and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men all the 
qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of the friends them-
selves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are 
alike in both friends, and that which is good without qualification is also with-
out qualification pleasant, and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and 
friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men. 
But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are 
rare. Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb 
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friendship. According to Bacon’s considerations friendship is useful in 
everyday activity as well as intellectual reasoning. Kant’s notion of friendship 
is determined – just like his ethics – by the “private duty of reason”.  
Friends, everyday intercourse and the social-, institutional- framework we 
meet in everyday practice provided the basis of the need to investigate these 
phenomena from a philosophical point of view. However, in the intellectual 
milieu of literacy, it was not easy to integrate the other individual into the 
general image of the Cartesian ego. That can be the reason for the unique 
and admirable role of the friend, as opposed to the role of the other fellow 
with whom we can have some relation for different practical purposes.  
Summing up theoretical considerations regarding friendship, we can say 
that although practical moments are present, the claim for an abstract and 
rational foundation of it is dominant.23 All practical aspects of friendship are 
considered shallow and secondary in comparison with the abstract and 
generally defined notion of friendship, which is noble, and in its perfection, 
represents higher principles. This kind of abstraction is in full harmony with 
other topics of philosophy in the age of literacy. However, being locked in the 
prison of our own thoughts as opposed to being able to reveal ourselves via 
communication with a friend, seems to be in contradiction with the notion of 
individual solitary reason. What good could a friend be in the framework of the 
Platonic ideas, or for the Cartesian ego, or even the Kantian “Transcendental 
Ego”24?  
This ambivalence can be understood as the ambivalence of the socially 
embedded human mind in the age of literacy, i.e. social make up and solitary 
reason. Next, I’m going to outline the main characteristics of literacy in the 
framework of the cognitive evolution of the human mind. 
SOLITARY REASON 
How could a pure, representational technology (in this case, alphabetical 
writing) impact upon cognitive customs and intellectual attitude? How could 
the purely technical means of writing establish rational reasoning? To answer 
                                                                                      
says, men cannot know each other till they have 'eaten salt together'; nor can 
they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found 
lovable and been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of 
friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they 
both are lovable and know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, 
but friendship does not.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, op. cit. Book 8/2-3 
23 The only exception seems to be Bacon. His methodological commitment to 
induction can explain his attitude towards the notion of friendship. 
24 Regarding “transcendental Ego” see Gellner, Solitude and Culture, op. cit. p. 45 
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these questions, I would first like to delineate the main characteristics of 
verbal expression, and then compare the noetical world of the primary oral 
and literate culture. 
Verbal expression, as a representational framework, automatically requires 
a certain degree of generality. This becomes quite clear if we compare it with 
image-like, or pictorial representation. The importance of similarities25, 
analyzing-reordering, and the linear structure of verbal expression have 
considerable effect on cognitive capacity and the thought process. Since 
alphabetical writing made it possible to detach verbal representation from its 
multi-dimensional and situational roots (i.e. live intercourse), the inclination 
towards abstract and general considerations significantly increased. 
This change unfolds from the investigations of Harold I. Innis, Walter J. 
Ong, and Eric A. Havelock, just to mention some representatives of the 
Toronto School. The Ongian notions of orality and literacy are based on 
studies which analyzed early written records from the new perspective of 
communications technology. These investigations uncovered characteristic 
patterns of preservation, the interweaving of ideas, cognitive capacity, and 
even the very organisation of communities.  
According to Ong’s terminology, a primary oral culture is one which does 
not possess any knowledge of writing. Such a culture must be conservative 
and traditional. Since information could only be stored in people’s minds, 
they developed a special language – a “storage language” as Havelock puts it 
– which was “devised orally for the purpose of survival.”26 This meant that it 
was only possible to preserve information by communicating it (i.e. through 
live intercourse among people). This restriction required a special technology 
to weave ideas together, and to transmit awareness of the new facts of life. 
With this special technology, the way of expression was additive and redun-
dant, and the expressions and words used were very closely embedded in 
concrete situations. Intercourse was empathetic, participatory and agonistic.27  
                                         
25 See “All that words can deal with, however, are similarities. The simple reason 
for all this is that words, with the exception of proper names, relation words, 
and syntactical devices, are mere conventional symbols for similarities. 
Although differences are just as perceptible as similarities,” words are not able 
to cope with them. “But that these differences are not statable in words does 
not mean that they are ineffable, for they are clearly communicable in non-
verbal ways.” W. M. Jr. Ivins, Prints and Visual Communication, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1953, p. 139 
26 E. A. Havelock The Muse Learns to Write. Reflections on Orality and Literacy 
from Antiquity to the Present, New Haven; London: Yale Univ. Press, 1986, p. 59 
27 See Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, 
London: Methuen, 1982, pp. 36-46ff. 
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After the invention of alphabetical writing several modifications took 
place.28 While, the transmission of ideas was liberated from certain restrictti-
ons, written contexts then had to be created for texts to be meaningful. With 
the help of writing, ideas became remarkably easier to handle and to 
elaborate. Part of the energy used earlier, simply for remembering, could be 
mobilised for other purposes. Alphabetical writing gave rise to the technical-
practical potential of creating concepts free of emotions, distantiated from 
the human life-world,29 and to the potential for systematic analysis of ideas, 
the ability to regard events as linearly structured in time,30 and therby to 
recognize the eternally human.31 Knowledge could be transmitted in a new 
way, through written records. However, to replace the live situation with 
mute words required considerable intellectual effort, and caused plenty of 
difficulties. These difficulties can be clearly demonstrated through the 
history of philosophy. 
Havelock, regarding Heraclitus’ recorded heritage, called attention to the 
fact that “Out of a total of some one hundred and thirty sayings, no less than 
forty-four, or thirty-four per cent, are preoccupied with the necessity to find 
a new and better language, or a new and more correct mode of experience, 
or are obsessed with the rejection of current methods of communication and 
current experience.”32 (Italics mine.) However, as time went on, difficulties 
                                         
28 Alphabetical writing was the instrument of the most accurate and the most 
abstract recording of the acoustic phenomenon of speech. Havelock under-
lined the fact, that – in respect to social control and governance –alphabetical 
writing was the only one to create a flexibility comparable to oral communi-
cation, because it did not ritualise and simplify the contents of it. See E. A. 
Havelock The Muse Learns to Write, op. cit. p. 59, Ong Orality and Literacy, 
op. cit. p. 28, and about the different types of writing see also Ibid. pp. 85f. 
29 See Ong, Orality and Literacy, op. cit. especially pp. 31-57ff. and 103-112ff; E. A. 
Havelock, The Greek Concept of Justice. From its Shadow in Homer to Its 
Substance in Plato, Cambridge; Massachusetts and London: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1978 and E. A. Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write. 
30 See Ong, Orality and Literacy, op. cit. 143; P. Gendolla, “Punktzeit. Zur 
Erfahrung in der Informationsgesellschaft” In: Im Netz der Zeit, ed.: R. 
Wendorf, Stuttgart: S. Hirzel, 1989. 
31 See I. Hajnal, “Európai kultúrtörténet - Írástörténet” In: Technika, művelődés. 
Tanulmányok, ed.: F. Glatz, Budapest, 1993, p. 18. 
32 “Heraclitus, no less than his audience, is compelled to have daily acquaintance 
with Hesiod's world. Yet it is precisely this acquaintance that he would wish to 
disrupt. He does not want to live in this world. No wonder, then, that he is 
obsessed by the difficulty of making statements which shall be from his point 
of view correct: and once a statement has been correctly worded, it appears no 
less difficult for an audience to take in what has been said or to communicate 
it to others. Out of a total of some one hundred and thirty sayings, no less than 
forty-four, or thirty-four percent, are preoccupied with the necessity to find a 
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arising from changing requirements of the changing representational frame-
work emerged in the form of different theoretical considerations, puzzles, and 
in terminology: reflection upon these changes became more and more implicit. 
Plato tried to define abstract notions of intelligence, courage, temperance, 
justice, and friendship, etc.33. Aristotle’s syllogism was intended to improve 
and control our thought-process.  
In a primary oral culture, knowledge of various facts, norms and rules was 
available only through live intercourse. As knowledge became attainable through 
written records as well as via communication with others, the question of reality, 
and accessibility of knowledge about reality became central issues. And accor-
dingly, the question of true knowledge and its foundation gained importance. 
The main questions of medieval metaphysics were also related to quite 
general issues. Medieval thought about universals and the question of 
transcendency and immanency with regard to the foundation of being gave 
rise to the central questions of metaphysics. Considerations connected to these 
questions had an abstract and complicated conceptual background. The 
concepts used to grasp reality created a specific hierarchical world far from 
everyday experience. 
Metaphysics in the Modern Age turned to the question of the reliability of 
knowledge – of knowledge that originates from the past, or from the senses. 
This specific distrust can be connected to the perception of a change in the 
technology for disseminating ideas – the technology of the printing press. 
Due to the limitations of this technology, the unreliability of manuscripts (and 
of diagrams, illustrations and pictorial statements as well) became conspicuous 
with regard to verbalised ideas. The most important task for metaphysics then, 
was to find a so-called correct manner of cognition, which meant to simul-
taneously create a firm basis for the sciences. The connection between modern 
                                                                                      
new and better language, or a new and more correct mode of experience, or 
are obsessed with the rejection of current methods of communication and 
current experience. This statistic is striking in a man who in later tradition 
was represented as a philosopher of materialism and fiery flux. Fire, in fact, is 
mentioned in only five of this sayings and has been inserted in the text of 
three more by scholars who perhaps have been a little overzealous to justify 
the traditional estimate of him. Clearly, if we take his ipsissima verba 
seriously, his preoccupation with problems of vocabulary, and the psycho-
logical response to vocabulary, must be regarded as central.” Eric A. Havelock, 
The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences (Princeton 
University Press, 1982, pp. 220-260) http://nyitottegyetem.phil-inst.hu/ 
kmfil/ kmkt/hav_pre3.htm 
33 Cf. “Plato is aware that he is engaged in a process of ‘naming names’, fixing them, 
we might say, as new names, new insofar as they are to become symbols of 
conceptual identities.” Eric A. Havelock, The Greek Concept of Justice, op. cit. 
p. 327 
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science and the technology of the printing press is quite obvious.34 And let 
me add that the technology of printing texts in thousands of identical copies 
gave rise to the important and novel concepts of originality and authorship. 
By the 18th century, literacy had reached its zenith. “Thinking in alpha-
betical characters” – using the formula of the Hungarian scholar István 
Hajnal – was the obvious intellectual milieu of the time, and the printing 
press had a deep effect on scientific development. The reliance on science, 
and the importance of the scientific method were stronger than ever before. 
Kant’s Copernican Turn is thus seen to be built upon two postulates: the 
insufficiency of logic, and the necessity of synthetic a priori statements, which 
then created possibilities for mathematics and sciences.35 These postulates 
mirror the ambivalence of the state of literacy: both disappointment and 
trust in the results of literacy at the same time. 
Despite this ambivalence, to reach beyond the individual mind (i.e. to 
discover its social-cultural and physical embeddedness) was a hopeless 
enterprise for quite a long time. Regarding the inability to reach beyond the 
“immanence of mind”, important changes took place in the 20th century. By 
this time, communication became equipped with the technology of photo-
graphy, film, and the “electrical speech machine," i.e. telephone. If we have a 
look at the metaphysics of the 20th century, we see that the glory of logic and 
the scientific method was no longer apparent. As new communication equip-
ment directly mediates numerous moments of everyday life, metaphysics 
discovered everyday practice and tried to integrate it into its framework. 
Heidegger took a decisive step when he left the immanence of the mind, and 
tried to focus on everyday life. He emphasized our “thrown-ness” into the 
world as opposed to the traditional dualism of object and subject. The world, 
earlier considered an object to be known, separated from the human 
intellect, emerged as a unity of references helping our orientation. Similarly, 
Wittgenstein focused his attention on embeddedness in everyday practice, in 
opposition to the theoretical analyzing attitude of earlier metaphysicians. As 
emphasized in his Philosophical Investigations, the authentic approach to 
language is given through its use, not through an abstract logical method. 
Likewise, Heidegger’s attempt to reveal the primordial meaning of logos – a 
renewal of the ancient concept of language as a kind of creation – was aimed 
at setting limits on the validity of modern logic. 
                                         
34 See e.g. Elisabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: 
Communications and Cultural Transformation in Early-Modern Europe I-II. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979 
35 For more detail see Zs. Kondor, „The Iconic Turn in Metaphysics”, In: K. Nyíri 
ed., A Sense of Places. The Global and the Local in Mobile Communication, 
Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2005, pp. 400 
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SOCIAL MAKEUP  
Due to the technology of the 20th century, philosophy was able to re-
discover the importance of our social makeup in a two-fold sense. As I men-
tioned, due to the means of communications technologies, particuliarities 
could be transmitted with the same ease as similarities and generalities. Thus, 
everyday practice emerged on the horizon of theoretical considerations. The 
results of recent scientific research on cognition are very useful, even 
inevitable, in re-thinking some main issues. 
Merlin Donald, in his book Origins of the Modern Mind, outlined the 
history of cognitive evolution. According to his theory, the development of 
representational skills were in close relation to social intelligence.36 Conside-
ring social intelligence, Donald emphasizes that “it is clear that language was 
the final step, and that presymbolic forms of social intelligence must have 
been its foundation”.37 Donald distinguishes three main transitions in human 
cognitive evolution: a shift from episodic to mimetic, then to mythical, and 
finally to theoretical culture. Each of these changes means the emergence of 
a new kind of representation, as well as an increased load on biological 
memory.38 Episodic memory, now complete with mimetic representation, 
could create community, with special habits and organization, which provided 
a certain kind of identity. Verbal representation, attached to the mimetic 
one, was the first stage, when mythical constructions as orienting world-
views and orders could come into existence. The transition from mythical to 
theoretical culture presupposes the existence of an effective external storing 
system. “[t]he first two evolutionary transitions would have greatly increased 
the load on biological memory. However, the final step in this tremendous 
cognitive expansion might have reduced the load on some aspects of biologi-
cal memory, by gradually shifting many storage tasks onto the newly 
                                         
36 Regarding social intelligence, Donald relies on the investigations of Robin I. M. 
Dunbar. Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the 
Evolution of Culture and Cognition, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, (1991) 
1993, p. 10 and Ibid. pp. 137. 
37 Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, op. cit. p. 137 
38 “Human memory had, from its inception, expanded the range of primate 
memory. The earliest form of hominid culture, mimetic culture, depended on 
an expansion in the self-representational systems of the brain and created the 
initial base for semantic memory storage, which consisted initially of 
representational action scenarios reflected in mime, gesture, craft, and skill. 
With the evolution of speech and narrative ability, there were even greater 
increases in the load on biological memory, adding not only the storage 
networks for phonological rules and the lexicon in its entirety but also a very 
large store of narrative conceptual knowledge.” Ibid. p. 319 
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developed E[xternal]S[ymbolic]S[toring system]. At the very least, the 
existence of the ESS must have forced a great change in priorities and 
memory organization.”39 
This apparently technological invention established considerable altera-
tions in cognitive habits. Let me quote: “theoretic culture broke with the meta-
phoric style of meaning in oral-mythic culture. Where narrative and myth 
attribute significances, theory is not concerned with significance in the same 
sense at all. Rather than modeling events by infusing them with meaning and 
linking them by analogy, theory dissects, analyzes, states laws and formulas, 
establishes principles and taxonomies, and determines procedures for the 
verification and analysis of information. It depends for its advanced develop-
ment on specialized memory devices, languages, and grammars.”40  
Donald’s reconstruction of cognitive evolution, and the argumentation for 
it clearly reveal “that the evolution of cognitive structure at the modular level 
might have continued well beyond the point at which physical evolution had 
stopped. Cultures restructure the mind, not only in terms of its specific 
contents, which are obviously culture-bound, but also in terms of its 
fundamental neurological organization. Whether the organization is vested 
in a parallel set of specific brain adaptations or not (and obviously, at times, 
it is not), the brain sets fewer constraints than formerly thought on the 
process of cognitive evolution. Culture can literally reconfigure the use 
patterns of the brain; and it is probably a safe inference from our current 
knowledge of cerebral plasticity, that those patterns of use determine much 
about how the exceptionally plastic human central nervous system is ultimately 
organized, in terms of cognitive structure.”41 The morals of his theory suggest 
that our representational skills are determined by what I call ‘social makeup’ 
(i.e. our sociability) and inventions related to communication have a decisive 
impact on intellectual and social institutions.  
FRIENDSHIP RE-VISITED 
Considering friendship from pedestrian point of view, intimacy and trust 
seem to be two decisive/crucial elements of it. These two qualities can be 
considered necessary and sufficient conditions of friendship even in the 
framework of perfect or moral friendship. However, these two attributes have 
importance, to variable degrees, in everyday intercourse as well. Clear-cut 
alphabetical reason honoured ideal friendship for its integrity regarding meta-
                                         
39 Ibid. p. 320 
40 Ibid. pp. 274 
41 Ibid. p. 14 
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physical presuppositions, even though some discrepancies arose considering 
the practical, experience-like deliberations and the speculative construction.  
Friendship did not appear in the philosophy of Wittgenstein or even 
Heidegger. However, they are two crucial representatives of the attempt to 
leave speculative-analytical attitude for the sake of the integrity of everyday 
experience and the theoretical-philosophical processing of it.  
Considering recent notions of friendship, we see that the honoured and 
unique image of it has started to diffuse, i.e. everyone with whom we have a 
live/active relationship, including trust and intimacy, with more intensity 
than average, we consider to be a friend. According to my hypothesis, this 
change is quite obvious from the perspective of communications technology. 
That is, since we have the opportunity to communicate easily at any time, 
and nearly everywhere, the space for solitary reasoning decreases. Since the 
institutional framework of communication has radically changed, we must 
re-structure our everyday activities, scheduling, and the ideals of human 
relationships accordingly. 
Let me quote from an article in The Guardian: “There are powerful 
reasons why we should create these bonds, even if we only start when we are 
older. The phenomenon of later births means families take up a smaller 
percentage of our lives. We wait years to have children, and we could be 70 
before we become grandparents for the first time. We have more time 
available, and fewer familial responsibilities, than the generations before us. 
We all want to feel needed and valued by others. It is possible for friends to 
fill that need, but only if we work at it.  
It isn't easy, because friendship is a subtle dance, and no one wants to be 
explicitly pursued when it's unwelcome, or explicitly dropped when they are 
not wanted. Nor does it come with any guarantees. People are unpredictable. 
But we need to play the game of friendship. Evidence shows that people with 
close friends live longer and are happier than those without. And friendship 
defines what it means to be human.” 42 
During the centuries when institutions of social intercourse were deter-
mined by solitary reason, friendship was the residual of our primordial social 
makeup. Recently, technological means made possible a return to, or at least, 
a similarity to communicational patterns which were dominant before the age 
of literacy (i.e. when social intercourse was considered the most effective way to 
maintain knowledge as well to solve difficulties). Due to new technological tools 
for keeping in touch in a more natural (i.e. multimedial) manner, communi-
cation re-gained special importance. Thus we communicate more, and with 
increased intensity. We can alter intensive connections in time for content or 
purpose. Accordingly, we gain and lose friends without losing our integrity.  
                                         
42 “What are friends for?” in: The Guardian, January 24, 2005  
